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INTRODUCTION

A recurring issue in the interpretation of federal employment laws is
whether individual supervisors may be held personally liable' for their
acts of illegal employment discrimination. 2 Although it seems reasonable that the actual perpetrators of discrimination should be held liable
for their actions in order to punish them and to deter others, many federal
courts have come to the opposite conclusion. By taking a serpentine path
toward settling this issue, a majority of federal courts now hold that managers cannot be held liable for damages resulting from their own discriminatory conduct in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VII") 3 or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
4
("ADEA").
A typical situation giving rise to the issue of individual liability involves a supervisor who illegally discriminates against a plaintiff employee. For example, suppose a supervisor intentionally withholds an
employment opportunity from the qualified plaintiff, such as a promotion
with expanded responsibilities, simply because the plaintiff is over forty
years old. In addition, the plaintiff's supervisor is frequently heard saying, "This company should retire everyone over forty so we can bring in
some fresh blood." This is a clear violation of the ADEA,5 and victims
of such discrimination often sue both their employers6 and the supervi1 "Individual liability," "personal liability," and "supervisor liability" are the terms generally used when referring to the accountability of the supervisor, who actually commits the
unlawful discrimination, for damages in a resulting lawsuit. This Note uses these terms
interchangeably.
2 The issue of personal liability under Title VII and the ADEA has already spawned
several other treatments. See Janice R. Franke, Does Title VII Contemplate PersonalLiability
ForEmployee/Agent Defendants?, 12 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 39 (1994); Scott B. Goldberg, Comment, DiscriminationBy Managers and Supervisors: Recognizing Agent Liability Under Title
VII, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 571 (1994); Phillip L. Lamberson, PersonalLiabilityfor Violations of
Title VI: Thirty Years of Indecision, 46 BAYLOR L. Rnv. 419 (1994); Joseph J. Manna, Personal Liability Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Piercing the Corporate Veil, 4 TmPnL
POL. & Crv. RIGHTs L. REv. 339 (1995); Michael D. Moberly & Linda H. Miles, The Impact
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on Individual Title VII Liability, 18 OKLA. Crry U. L. REv. 475
(1993); Clara J. Montanari, Comment, Supervisor Liability Under Title VII: A "Feel Good"
Judicial Decision, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 351 (1996).
3 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1994).
4 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1994).
5 See infra Part II.A.2. for a discussion of the history and purpose of the ADEA.
6 This Note uses the terms "employer" and "employer-entity" to denote the business or
corporation employing the plaintiff who has suffered illegal employment discrimination. The
legal meaning of "employer" as defined by Title VII and the ADEA is the central issue of this
Note. See infra Part II.B. for a discussion of the competing definitions of "employer" under
Title VII and the ADEA.
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sors who had authority over the employment decisions 7 which formed
the basis of the discrimination. If the employer is bankrupt or is other-

wise judgment proof,8 recovery for a plaintiff hinges on whether the
court hearing the case interprets the antidiscrimination statutes to allow
for the imposition of liability on individual supervisors. 9 Though one
might expect that an employee would be allowed to sue the very person
who committed the discriminatory act, there is some confusion on this
issue. If the court decides that the supervisor cannot be held personally
liable, the plaintiffs claims against the supervisor will be dismissed,10
and the employee will be left without a judicial remedy.
Title VII and the ADEA permit an aggrieved employee-plaintiff to
sue the "employer"" entity for damages resulting from illegal supervisory discrimination. The courts, however, have disagreed on whether the
language of Title VII and the ADEA creates a basis for seeking relief
from individuals in their personal capacities. This Note argues that the
best way for courts to effectuate the intentions of fair employment stat-

utes is for them to deny individual liability. Part II briefly examines the
purposes and development of Title VII and the ADEA and closes by

identifying the crux of the judicial conflict-the statutory construction of
the word "employer." Part III then surveys and analyzes the judicial decisions addressing the issue of individual liability under Title VII and the
ADEA. Part IV offers several competing theories that may be used to
support or deny individual liability. It argues that, under established doctrines of statutory interpretation, the language of the statutes requires a
reading that precludes claims against supervisory personnel in their individual capacities.

7 Judicial decisions holding supervisors personally liable for unlawful employment discrimination have required that the supervisor have power over the hiring, firing, or employment conditions of the plaintiff such that he supervisor may be considered to be acting as an
agent of the employer. See House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 161 (M.D.N.C.
1988) (the key inquiry is whether a supervisor "had the authority and discretion over plaintiff's
discharge for allegedly discriminatory reasons"); Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 740 F.
Supp. 127, 135 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (personal liability claim under ADEA available where plaintiff alleges that the individual defendants "participated in the decision process that forms the
basis of the discrimination").
8 The issue of personal liability is only relevant in this situation because a plaintiff will
normally be able to recover complete relief from the employer-entity.
9 In some jurisdictions it was possible to shop for a judge sympathetic to the issue of
personal liability. For example, until recently, the district courts of the Second Circuit were in
disarray. See infra note 97.
10 The issue of supervisor liability will most likely be relevant in the context of an individual defendant's motion to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim, FED. R. Crv. P.
12(b)(6), or on motion for summary judgment, FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
11 See infra Part ll.B. for the statutory definitions of "employer."
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II. TITLE VII AND THE ADEA: THE BEST OF INTENTIONS
Title VII12 and the ADEA 13 prohibit employers from making certain
employment decisions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, or age.' 4 This Part briefly surveys 15 the purposes of these two
antidiscrimination statutes and highlights the language that courts have
scrutinized in deciding the issue of individual liability under these laws.
A.

THE PURPOSES OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT STATUTES

1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196416
By enacting Title VII, Congress created a national policy of nondiscrimination in the workplace' 7 by making it unlawful for those controlling employment decisions to discriminate on the basis of specified
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1994) (originally enacted as Pub. L.
No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253).
13 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. IV 1994) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 90202, 81 Stat. 602).
14 The relevant sections in Title VnI and the ADEA state:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--() to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual
with respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to
limit, segregate, or classify ... employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect [the individual's] status as an employee, because of
such an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) (Title VII).
It shall be unlawful for an employer--(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect
to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges or employment, because of
such individual's age; (2) to limit segregate, or classify ... employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
age ....
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988) (ADEA).
15 For a more thorough treatment of the evolution of Title VII and the ADEA, see generally Janice R. Franke, Does Title VII Contemplate Personal Liability For Employee/Agent
Defendants?, 12 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 39 (1994); Steven K. Sanborn, Note, Miller v. Maxwell's
International,Inc.: Individual Liability for Supervisory Employees Under Title VII and the
ADEA, 17 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 143 (1995).
16 In addition to employment discrimination, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also dealt with
voting rights, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title I, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971 (1988)), public accommodations, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title Ii, 78 Stat. 243, 243-46
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000a-6 (1988)), and school desegregation, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, Title IV 78 Stat. 246, 246-49 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2000c-9
(1988)).
17 See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (statement of Hon. George
Meader), reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATrVE HISTORY OF TrrLE VII AND XI OF THE Civn.
RIGHTs AcT OF 1964, 2046 (1969).
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characteristics.' 8 The purposes of Title VII are simple: to help eliminate

irrational discrimination, to achieve equality in employment opportunities and remove the barriers to advancement that have operated against
certain groups, 19 and "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on
account of unlawful employment discrimination. '20 Congress reaffirmed
its commitment to these principles with subsequent amendments 21 in
197222 and in 199123 that expanded the scope of Title VII.
As an antidiscrimination statute, Title VII is remedial in character
and should be liberally construed to achieve its purposes. 24 It is therefore the duty of the courts to make sure that Title VII works and that the
intent of Congress is not hampered by a strict construction of the statute
in a battle with semantics. 5 Accordingly, the courts have rejected a multitude of procedural and technical defenses invoked to limit the effective26
ness of court-ordered remedies in Title VII cases.
2. Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967
By passing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,27
Congress further expanded the scope of employment discrimination

laws and again demonstrated its commitment to ensuring equal opportu18 Namely, race, color, religion, sex, national origin. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
19 Albremarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S 405, 417 (1975).
20 Id. at 418. "[T]he removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification is essential to achieve the Act's ultimate purpose of eliminating
employment discrimination." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
21 In the early years of Title VII, the statute "in most respects, proved to be a cruel joke."
S. Rap. No. 415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1971). "I2ihe time has come for Congress to correct
the defects of its own legislation. The promises of equal job opportunity made in 1964 must
be made realities ... ." ld.
22 The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108 & 5314 and various sections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e).
The amendment reduced the minimum employee requirement from 25 to 15.
23 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as
amended in various sections of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e). See
infra Part IV.B.2. discussing the expansion of Title VII under this amendment.
24 Tart v. Hill Behan Lumber Co., 31 F.3d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 1994); Rogers v. EEOC,
454 F.2d 234,238 (5th Cir. 1971). 'Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is to be accorded
a liberal construction in order to carry out the purpose of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of racial discrimination." Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist.,
875 F.2d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d
421, 425 (8th Cir. 1970)).
25 Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986)
(quoting Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970)).
26 Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment OpportunityActs of 1964 and 1972: A Critical
Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 INDUS. RaL. L.J. 1, 27
(1977).
27 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. 1996).
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nity in the workplace. 28 The ADEA prohibits unqualified age discrimination against employees over forty years of age. 29 The statute states:
"It shall be unlawful for an employer ...

to fail or refuse to hire or to

discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's age." 30 Thus, the ADEA forbids
employers from predicating employment decisions on arbitrary age limits
that ignore an employee's ability to perform a given job3 1 To effectuate
this goal, 32 the ADEA authorizes courts to grant such legal and equitable
relief 33 as may be appropriate to rid the workplace of unlawful age dis-

crimination, to return victims to the positions they would have occupied
had the discrimination not occurred and to effectuate the purpose of the
Act.

B.

34

WHO Is THE "EMPLOYER?" -

FRAMING THE ARGUMENTS

Because the substantive prohibitions of Title VII and the ADEA run
to the "employer," 35 courts analyzing the issue of individual liability
28 The ADEA was enacted "to promote employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help
employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988).
29 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988).
30 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1) (1988) (emphasis added).
31 See Daniel B. Frier, Age Discriminationand the ADA: How the ADA May Be Used to
Arm Older Americans Against Age DiscriminationBy Employers Who Would Otherwise Escape Liability Under the ADEA, 66 TEMP. L. Rav. 173, 177 (1993).
32 Congress stated that the ADEA's purpose, like that of Title VII, is to "eliminate discrimination from the workplace." House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 162
(M.D.N.C. 1988).
33 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1988).
34 The scope of the ADEA is arguably broader than that of Title VII. See Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584-85 (1978). While adopting Title VII's framework to enact substantive prohibitions against age discrimination in the workplace, Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans,
441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979), Congress concluded its cut and paste, of the ADEA by incorporating the remedies and procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter FLSA). 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988 & Supp. 1996). "The provisions of [the ADEA] shall be enforced in
accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in [sections] 211(b),
216, ... and 217 [of the FLSA]." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). See also Lorillard,434 U.S. at
582.
The FLSA was enacted in 1938 in order to improve the working conditions of the nation's workforce. Among other things, the statute created a minimum wage, 29 U.S.C. § 206
(1988), established a standard for full-time working hours, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1988), and established child labor restrictions, 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1988). Under the FLSA, an employer "includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1988). Courts have used this language to impose personal
liability on individuals for employment actions violating the FLSA attributable to them as a
consequence of their authority over employment decisions. See Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck
Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 582
(1978)). By extension, had Congress also adopted the FLSA's substantive definition of "employer," it would be conceivable to hold individuals liable under the ADEA.
35 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988) (ADEA).
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have focused on the construction of this term as defined by the statutes to
determine who may be held liable under this language.36 A Title VII

employer is "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce 3 7 who

has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a person."38
The statutory language of the ADEA 39 defines the term "employer" al40
most identically.

1. "Any Agent"
Using the "plain meaning rule" of statutory interpretation, 4 1 several
courts have held that the phrase "and any agent of such a person" means
just what it says-agents of the employer-entity are to be considered as
"employers" for the purpose of enforcing Title VII and the ADEA.
These courts have allowed actions under these laws against individuals
who occupy supervisory positions or have an impact on employment

decisions.4 2
36 For a relevant but outdated discussion and survey of the definition of the term "employer," see Annotation, Meaning of Term "Employer" as Defined in § 701(b) of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 69 A.L.R. FED. 191 (1984).
37 Authority for the enactment of Title VII, as well as the rest of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, was derived from the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1. However, in
1972 Congress expanded the coverage of Title VII to include states under the authority of the
Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend XIV. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108 & 5314
and various sections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e). See infra note 186 for a discussion of Congress'
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
38 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988) (emphasis added). The full text of the section states:
"The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person... "
39 The drafting of the ADEA was based on the existing language of Title VII. See Miller
v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993); Lowe v. Commack United Sch.
Dist., 886 F.2d 1364 (2d Cir. 1989) ("ITihe substantive prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haee verba from Title VII."), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026 (1990).
40 The only difference is the jurisdictional limitation based on the number of employees.
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988). The full text of the section states: "The term 'employer' means a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each
working day in each twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year... The term also means (1) any agent of such a person ...." Id.
41 When interpreting the meaning of statutes, the cardinal rule is to first look at the plain
language of the text. See infra Part IV.A. for a discussion of why the "any agent" language of
the statutes cannot be understood as recognizing individual liability.
42 See infra Part III.B., analyzing cases imposing individual liability on supervisor personnel. The decisions that have upheld supervisor liability have been consistent in requiring
that individual liability may only be imposed on agents who exercise significant control over
the plaintiff's hiring, firing, or conditions of employment. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d
1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993); Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1986) (defining
an "agent" as someone who "participated in the decision-making process that forms the basis
of the discrimination"); York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir.
1982) (dictum) (defining "agent" as an "employee to whom employment decisions have been
delegated by the employer"). See also McAdoo v. Toll 591 F. Supp. 1399, 1405 (D.Md.
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2. Respondeat Superior
On the other hand, an increasing majority of federal courts have

interpreted the agent provisions as merely enacting the doctrine of respondeat superior 4 3 in order to ensure that the acts of individual employees are imputed to the employer entity and have held that these fair
employment laws were not intended to provide plaintiffs with a remedy
against the actual individual offenders. 44 These courts have also reasoned that the equitable statutory remedies originally afforded plaintiffs
by Title VII 45-back pay and reinstatementa'6-are characteristic of
those levied against businesses, not employee supervisors. This remedial
structure evidenced Congress' intention not to extend remedies to in47
clude personal liability.
In the last three years every federal circuit court addressing the issue
of individual liability under Title VII and the ADEA has decided against
the imposition of individual liability. Only two federal circuit courts of
appeals have declined to accept review of this issue, and it is only a
matter of time before they join the majority.
III.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS

This Part analyzes federal judicial decisions addressing the question
of individual liability under Title VII and the ADEA. It first examines
1984); Jeter v. Bosell, 554 F. Supp. 946, 952-54 (N.D. W. Va. 1983); Jones v. Metropolitan
Denver Sewage Disposal Dist. No. 1, 537 F. Supp. 966, 970 (D. Colo. 1982). Only individuals
who contribute meaningfully to employment decisions and who exercise meaningful control in
the work place have the requisite supervisory powers to trigger potential liability. Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1468, 1527 (M.D. Fla. 1991) ("Individual liability
attaches ... to the generals, not their soldiers.").
An additional issue involves the distinction between supervisors who actually participate
in the unlawful discrimination and those who merely have knowledge of it, the difference
between misfeasance and non-feasance. For a brief discussion of this issue see Manna, supra
note 2 at 350-51. See also Douglas L. Williams, Individual Liability and Defending Individual
Co-Defendants, C463 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 205, 211 (1989).
43 Respondeat superior is a doctrine that holds "a master liable in certain cases of wrongful acts of his servant, and a principal liable for those of his agent." BLACK's LAW DicrioNARY 1311 (6th ed. 1990).
44 See infra Part II.A.

45 The 1991 amendments to Title VII subsequently expanded the remedies available to
plaintiffs to include compensatory and punitive damages. Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(1991) (codified as amended in various sections of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
and 2000e). The discussion of how the remedial structure of Title VII influences the interpretation of "employer" is included infra Part IV.B.
46 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1994).
47 See infra Part IV.B. and accompanying text discussing why the remedies afforded
plaintiffs imply that Congress did not intend to create individual liability. See also Williams
v. Hevi-Duty Elec. Co., 668 F. Supp. 1062, 1070 (M.D. Tenn. 1986) (no individual liability
because the "employer guilty of violation of Title VII is the one against whom affirmative
relief, including back pay, may be adjudged"), rev'd on other grounds, 819 F.2d 620 (6th Cir.
1987).

1996]

TITLE

VII

AND THE

ADEA

those jurisdictions that do not recognize individual liability and then
surveys the remaining jurisdictions that up to now have failed to resolve
this issue.

A.

INDIVIDUAL LLABiLrTY BARRED

Beginning with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Miller v. Maxwell's
Int'l,Inc. 48 in 1993, ten circuit courts of appeals have held that individuals can not be adjudged personally liable for their acts of employment
discrimination. Because Miller is representative of the arguments
presented on both sides of the issue, the survey of case law begins with
that opinion.
1. The Ninth Circuit -

Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc.

In Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit ruled that individual employees cannot be held liable under Title VII or the ADEA for their own discriminatory acts. 49
Phyllis Miller worked as a manager at the defendant corporation's restaurant and alleged that she had been subjected to a pattern of harassment
and was discharged because of her sex and age. She brought sex and age
discrimination claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and the Equal Pay
Act5 ° against her corporate employer and six individual defendants-executives, managers, and lower level employees of Maxwell's
51
International.
Although the Ninth Circuit stated that the argument in support of
individual liability based on the "any agent" language was "not without
merit," 52 the court relied on Padway v. Palches5 3 in finding there was no
48 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. deniedsub nor. Miller v. LaRosa, _ U.S. _, 114
S. Ct. 1049 (1994).

49 Id.at 588.
50 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (incorporated into and enforced through the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994)).
51 Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., No. C-87-1906-WWS, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10479,
at *4 (N.D. Ca. Jan. 17, 1990), afftd, 991 F.2d. 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nor.
Miller v. LaRosa, _ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994). Although the district court stated that it
was "unlikely that Congress intended to impose personal liability on employees," it ultimately
permitted the plaintiff to amend her complaint to plead specific instances of intentional discrimination by the individual defendants. Id.
52 Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
53 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982). In Padway, an elementary school principal brought
suit against the school board and the superintendent of her school alleging sex discrimination
in her compensation, reassignment, and discharge. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment to the defendants. Padway was decided before the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), but the Miller court made no acknowledgment of that.
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individual liability under Title VII or the ADEA.5 4 The Padway court
had previously held that Title VII "speaks of unlawful practices by the
employer and not ... by officers or employees of the employer. Back
pay awards are paid by the employer. The individual defendants cannot
be held liable for back pay. -55
The majority in Miller accepted the district court's conclusion that
the "obvious purpose of [the] provision was to incorporate respondeat
superior liability into the statute, '56 and therefore supervisors are protected from liability in their individual capacities.57 The opinion extended this line of reasoning to ADEA cases "because of the similarities
in the Title VII and ADEA statutory schemes." 58
The majority further noted that both statutes excluded small employers from coverage (by requiring a minimum number of employees
before an entity could be considered a covered employer) and extrapolated that if the intention of this provision was to protect small entities
from the burdensome liability and the cost of litigation, Congress certainly would not contradict itself by extending liability to individual defendants: "If Congress decided to protect small entities with limited
resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to allow civil liability to run against individual employees... [t]he statutory
scheme itself indicates that Congress did not intend to impose individual
liability on employees. ' 5 9
The Miller court also addressed the concern that its holding "would
encourage supervisory personnel to believe that they may violate Title
VII with impunity." 60 The court stated: "An employer that has incurred
civil damages because one of its employees believes he can violate Title
VII with impunity will quickly correct that employee's erroneous be54 Miller, 991 F.2d at 588. The Miller court also cited two district court cases as well:
Seib v. Elko Motor Inn, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 272, 274 (D. Nev. 1986) (holding that Title VII
claims cannot be made against plaintiffs supervisor because back pay is paid by the employer)
and Pree v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 607 F. Supp. 945, 950 (D. Nev. 1985) ("only the
employer may be held liable for the back wages; the individual employee may not"). Miller,
991 F.2d at 587. See also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1533
(M.D. Fla. 1991).

55 Padway, 665 F.2d at 968 (citations omitted). Although the plaintiff also sought compensatory and punitive damages rather than back pay, the court still dismissed the claim because these forms of relief were not yet provided for in the statute at that time. See infra Part
IV.B.2. for a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII to allow for
compensatory and punitive damages.
56 Miller, 991 F.2d. at 587 (internal quotations omitted).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 588.
59 Id.
60 Id.

1996]

TITLE VII

AND THE

ADEA

lief."61 It is in the business interests of the employer to monitor and
62
discipline employees who violate antidiscrimination laws.
Judge Fletcher dissented in Miller and observed that, even if individuals were not liable for back pay before Padway,6 3 the Civil Rights
Act of 199164 expanded the remedies available to plaintiffs by authorizing recoveries of compensatory and punitive damages for victims of intentional discrimination. 6 5 Judge Fletcher reasoned that these new
provisions justified imposing individual liability when there is intentional
discrimination because the new remedies were no longer limited to compensation traditionally paid by businesses, namely back pay and reinstatement.6 6 The dissent also rejected the majority's comparison
between the ADEA and Title VII, stating that although there are many
similarities between the two statutes, the ADEA's scope of relief is
broader than that afforded by Title VII.67 The ADEA incorporates the
remedies and procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act that allows an
68
individual to be held personally liable.
The majority countered these contentions by noting that the 1991
amendments 69 only allowed compensatory and punitive damages against
employers on a sliding scale based upon the employer's size and that
there were no provisions on the scale for individuals. 70 The majority
further noted that the amendments did not do away with the exclusion of
small employers from Title VII and ADEA coverage. 7 1 With this conclusion the Ninth Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to explicitly disavow claims of individual liability under Title VII and the
ADEA.
2.

The Fourth Circuit-

Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp.

In Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp.,72 the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law to the defendants
61 Id.

62 It is important to note that employers may have a claim against the employee for
contribution or indemnification for adverse judgments. See Douglas L. Williams, Individual
Liability and Defending Individual Co-defendants, C463 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 205 (1989).
63 Miller, 991 F.2d at 588 (Fletcher, J. dissenting).
64 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in various sections
of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e).
65 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
66 Miller, 991 F.2d at 588.
67 Id. at 589. See generally House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 160
(M.D.N.C. 1988).
68 Id. See supra 34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ADEA's incorporation of FLSA procedural provisions.
69 See 42 U.S.C. §1981a(b) (3) (1994).
70 Miller, 991 F.2d at 587 n.2.
71 Id.

72 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, .__U.S._., 115 S. Ct. 666 (1994).

on an ADEA claim, holding that actions against individuals could not be
brought under the ADEA.73 The plaintiffs in this case were supervisory
employees working for the defendant corporation when they were laid
off from their positions. The plaintiffs filed ADEA claims against both
the corporation and the vice-president primarily responsible for the layoff
decisions. After a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the district court
granted defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, reasoning
that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case. 74
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the claim against the vicepresident in his individual capacity as an initial matter. 75 Like the Ninth
Circuit, the court read section 630(b) of the ADEA "as an unremarkable
expression of respondeat superior-that discriminatory personnel actions
76
taken by an employer's agent may create liability for the employer."
The court also agreed with the Miller court's explanation that the
ADEA's small business exemption was meant to reduce the burden on
entities with limited resources. The court stated that "it would be incongruous to hold that the ADEA does not apply to the owner of a business
employing, for example, ten people, but that it does apply with full force
to a person who supervises the same number of workers in a company
employing twenty or more."'77 Therefore, in the Fourth Circuit, ADEA
liability is limited to the employer entity and does not reach individual
78
agents of the employer.
3.

The Fifth Circuit-

Grant v. Lone Star Co.

The Fifth Circuit has also followed the lead of the Miller court in
holding that managers cannot be sued in their individual capacities under
73
74
75
76

Id. at 511 ("[T]he ADEA limits civil liability to the employer.").
See id. at 510.
Id. (citing Miller, 991 F.2d at 589).
1d at 510.
77 Id.

78 The court hinted that employees, acting as agents for their employers, "may not be
shielded ...

in all circumstances," Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 510 n.1, and limited its holdings to

those "of a plainly delegable character." Id. The court cited to Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879
F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989). However, the decision in Parolineregarding individual liability was

effectively overruled by Birkbeck. In Paroline,the plaintiff sued the Unisys Corporation and
an Unisys employee for sexual harassment under Title VII. The court of appeals reversed the
district court grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the Title VII claims.
Paroline, 879 F.2d at 113. In addressing the individual liability claim the court stated, "[a]n
individual qualifies as an 'employer' under Title VII [and therefore becomes individually liable] if he or she serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control over the
plaintiff's hiring, firing or condition of employment.... The supervisory employee need not
have ultimate authority to hire, fire to qualify as an employer, as long as he or she has significant input into such personnel decisions." Id. at 104 (citations omitted). The language of
Birkbeck seems to make this analysis in Parolinea mere discussion of the respondeat superior
doctrine.
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federal employment discrimination laws. In doing so, this circuit has
managed to come full circle in a period of a dozen years.
Initially, the Fifth Circuit established non-liability by its ruling in
Clanton v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd.79 However, in Hamilton v. Rodgers,80 the court held that an individual was subject to liability for partic8l
ipating in supervisory decisions found to be discriminatorily motivated.
The plaintiff in Hamilton, an employee of the Houston Fire Department,
asserted Title VII claims against the Fire Department and various individual defendants alleging racial harassment and discriminatory discharge. The Fire Department and Hamilton's immediate supervisor were
found liable by the district court and were ordered to give back pay and
compensatory damages.8 2 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, stating that Title
VII's definition of "employer" was broad and should be given a liberal
interpretation:8 3 "To hold otherwise would encourage supervisory personnel to believe that they may violate Title VII with impunity." 84 Thus
the Fifth Circuit extended liability to Hamilton's supervisors because
they had authority over staffing, assignment, and other employment deci85
sions which formed the basis for the discrimination.
The holding in Hamilton was subsequently limited in Harvey v.
Blake.8 6 In Harvey, the court limited the liability of public officials to
87
claims alleging employment discrimination in their official capacities.
8
8
Although the court defined the term "employer" liberally, it held that
any recovery against the defendant must be based upon the defendant's
79

649 F.2d 1084, 1099 (5th Cir. 1981).

80 791 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1986).
81 Id. at 442-43. "We agree with the view that '[a] person is an agent under § 2000e(b) if
he participated in the decision-making process that forms the basis of the discrimination."' Id.
(citing Jones v. Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal Dist., 537 F. Supp. 966, 970 (D. Colo.

1982)).

82 Hamilton v. Rodgers, 573 F. Supp. 452, 454 (S.D. Tex. 1983), aff'd, 791 F.2d 439
(5th Cir. 1986). The Fifth Circuit noted that the lower court found that there was a racist work
environment and a deliberate effort to punish the plaintiff for seeking equal treatment. Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 442. The supervisors not only ignored the racist behavior, but also intentionally discriminated against Hamilton themselves. Id.
83 Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 442 ("The definition of 'employer' is, however, broad, including agents of the actual employer.... Title VII 'should be accorded a liberal interpretation in
order to effectuate the purpose of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and
humiliation of ethnic discrimination.") (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.
1971)).
84 Id. at 443.
85 1d at 442. The defendants made car assignments, had authority over work shifts, and
file reports that led to Hamilton's suspension in 1982.
86 913 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1990).
87 Id. at 227-28. The plaintiff in Harvey was employed as an inspector in the Houston
Public Service Department and alleged sexual harassment by the supervisor.
88 Id. at 227 ("immediate supervisors are employers when delegated the employer's
traditional rights, such as hiring and firing.").
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role as an agent of the city acting in an official capacity. 89 The opinion
explicitly qualified the Hamilton decision to this extent. 90
Finally, in Grant v. Lone Star Co.,9 1 the Fifth Circuit abolished the
public-private distinction and held that individual defendants could not
incur liability under Title VII. In this case, the plaintiff filed suit against
the Lone Star Corporation and individual employees of the corporation
for sexual harassment and hostile work environment under Title VII. After a jury trial, only the Branch Manager was found liable. In addition,
the trial court held that the Branch Manager was personally liable for
sexual harassment because he directly participated in acts that contrib92
uted to a hostile work environment.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that individual defendants,
as a matter of law, could not be held liable under Title VII for their own
alleged discriminatory acts. 93 Citing Clanton v. Orleans Parish Sch.
Bd.,94 the Fifth Circuit stated, "[o]nly 'employers,' not individuals acting
in their individual capacity who do not otherwise meet the definition of
'employers,' can be liable under Title VII." 95 In addition, the court
noted that the structure of Title VII, in setting out the damages available
to plaintiffs, further indicates that Congress did not intend to hold individual defendants liable, since reinstatement and back pay are not the
96
usual remedies expected from a fellow employee.
4.

The Second Circuit -

Tomka v. Seiler Corp.

Until recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit had failed to expressly address the issue of individual liability
under Title VII or the ADEA. The district courts, most notably those
89 Id. at 227-28.

90 The court stated:
[T]here is one case... in which we failed to make the distinction between a supervisor's official and unofficial capacity... [o the extent that Hamiltonis inconsistent
with the rule established in Clanton [v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 649 F.2d 1084 (5th

Cir. Unit A July 1981)], that public officials may be liable for back pay under Title
VII in their official capacity only, Hamilton is nonauthoritative.
Id. at 228 n.2.

Courts outside the Fifth Circuit have interpreted Harvey more broadly as a general prohibition against personal liability. See Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th
Cir. 1993); Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Weiss
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 772 F. Supp. 407, 411 (N.D. Ill.
1991).

91 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994).
92 See id. at 650.
93 Id. at 653.

94 649 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
95 Grant, 21 F.3d at 652.

96 Id. at 653. "In particular, the [Clanton] court noted that title VII makes 'employer[s]'
responsible for back pay damages, whereas 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies specifically to 'persons."' Id. at 652-53.
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located in the Southern District of New York, were in disarray. 97 Finally, in Tomka v. Seiler Corp.,9 8 the Second Circuit settled the law of
individual liability in one of the most contentious jurisdictions by and
became one of the latest federal circuit courts to decide against the impo-

sition of individual liability.
The plaintiff, Carole Tomka, alleged that she had been subject to
sexual harassment during her tenure at Seiler. She also alleged that she
was terminated because she threatened to pursue criminal charges against
a supervisor and her two co-workers who had sexually assaulted her. 99
Tomka subsequently filed suit against the Seiler Corporation and three
co-employees, claiming hostile work environment and retaliatory discharge under Title VII and the New York Human Rights Law. 10 0 The
district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all counts
except for the common law claims.' 0 '
The Second Circuit affirmed with respect to the dismissal of the
Title VII claims against the individuals.' 0 2 After briefly surveying the
conflict in the district courts of the Second Circuit and the law in other
circuits, the court stated that while a literal reading of Title VII implies
individual liability, "a broader consideration of Title VII indicates that
this interpretation of the statutory language does not comport with Congress' clearly expressed intent in enacting that statute."' 0 3 Citing Miller,
the court explained that the statutory scheme of Title VII limiting liability to employers with more than 14 employees showed Congress' intent
not to burden small entities.l 04
97 See, e.g., Corragio v. Time, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 637, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5399
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1995) (dismissing Title VII claims against individual supervisors); Donato
v. Rockefeller Financial Services, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17709 *6-*7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12,
1994) ("[I]ndividuals may be liable.., if they had direct supervisory authority over the plaintiff, or independent authority to fire the plaintiff, and participated in the allegedly discriminatory action."; Reilly v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7317
(S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1994) (no individual liability unless unique claims not chargeable to the
organizational entity); Bradley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 647 F. Supp.
197, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (no individual liability); Dirschel v. Speck, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9257 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1994) (supervisor with independent liability to terminate plaintiff is
subject to individual liability); Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Col, 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1180
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (individual and official liability under Title VII); Archer v. Globe Motorist
Supple Co., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 211, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (individualized conduct will support
individual liability); Falbaum v. Pomerant, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10370 (S.D.N.Y. July 25,
1995) (no supervisor liability under ADEA). See generally Evan J. Charkes, IndividualLiability Under Title VII, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 9, 1995, p. 1.
98 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995).
99 Id.at 1300-02.
100 Id.at 1299. Tomka also had claims under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) and
common law assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
101 Id.at 1303-04.
102 Id.at 1313-16.
103 Id. at 1314.
104 Id.
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The circuit court then addressed Title VIl's remedial provisions.
The court generally "agree[d] that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is a valuable source of insight into Congress' intent on the issue of individual
liability." 10 5 However, the initial remedial structure of Title VII only allowed for the equitable relief of back pay and reinstatement which are
traditional remedies from the employer-entity.' 0 6 Although the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 expanded the remedies available, it also "calibrate[d]
the maximum allowable damage award to the size of the employer and
failed to repeal the exemption for defendants with less than fifteen employees."' 0 7 Thus, the entire remedial structure of Title VII addresses
itself toward employer-entities, not individuals. 0 8
5.

The Seventh Circuit - EEOC v. AIC Security
Investigations, Ltd.

The Seventh Circuit's ruling in EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd.109 settled the conflicting common law of individual liability in
this jurisdiction.o10 Prior to AIC Security, the Seventh Circuit had hinted
at the possibility of individual liability in Shager v. Upjohn Co.'' In
Shager,the circuit court reversed a lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer, finding that an intentional act
of an employee - when performed within the scope of that employee's
authority - was an act of the employer and could be imputed to the
employer under respondeat superior."2 In addition, the court implied
105 Id. at 1315 n.13.
106 Id. at 1315.
107 Id. at 1315.

108 Id. (citing Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993)).
109 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995).

110 CompareHaltek v. Village of Park Forest, 864 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (supervisory employees are not liable under Title VII or the ADA); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858
F. Supp.1393, 1405 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (supervisors cannot be held personally liable under Title
VII, ADEA, or ADA); Jaskowski v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1094, 1098 (N.D.
Il1.1994) (Title VII does not permit suits against individuals); Pelech v. Klaff-Joss, LP, 828 F.
Supp. 525, 529 (N.D. Il1. 1993) (agents not subject to individual liability); Pommier v. James
L. Edelstein Enters., 816 F. Supp. 476, 480-81 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (supervisors not personally
liable under Title VII or ADA); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 772 F. Supp. 407, 410-11
(N.D. IIl. 1991) (supervisors not personally liable under Title VII); with Jendusa v. Cancer
Treatment Ctrs. of America, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (surveying the case law
of the 7th Circuit and concluding that Title VII, the ADEA and the ADA recognize individual
liability); Raiser v. O'Shaughnessy, 830 F. Supp. 1134, 1137 (N.D. Il. 1993) (recognizing
personal liability under Title VII); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769,
784-86 (N.D. 111.1993) (personal liability for decision-making supervisors under Title VII);
Deluca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 606, 607 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (personal liability under
Title VII and ADA); Janopoulos v. Harvey L. Walner & Assocs., Ltd., 835 F. Supp. 459, 461
(N.D. Ili. 1993) (personal liability under Title VII and ADA).
11 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990).
112 Id. at 404. (citing with approval House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159
(M.D.N.C. 1988)).
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that individual supervisors should also be held liable under the ADEA. It
stated the "statutory language ...could mean... that [the supervisor] is
liable along with the [employer], or even possibly instead of [the employer]." With its ruling in AIC Security, however, the Seventh Circuit
joined the majority of other circuits in finding that individual employees
could not incur liability.
In AIC Security, Charles Wessel was the executive director of AIC
Security Investigation Ltd., a company providing private security guards
in the Chicago area. In June 1987, Wessel discovered that he had lung
cancer, and following five years of treatment, Wessel was diagnosed in
1992 with inoperable metastatic brain cancer, a terminal illness. During
the previous five years, Wessel continued to work for AIC, though he
missed work from time to time.
In July 1992, Ruth Vrdolyak became owner of AIC. Aware of Wessel's illness, she fired him on July 29, 1992. Wessel filed a charge with
the EEOC, and in November both the EEOC and Wessel sued AIC and
Ruth Vrdolyak alleging a violation of the Americans With Disabilities
Act ("ADA").1 1 3 The Americans with Disabilities Act is analogous to
Title VII and the ADEA in its broad definition of "employer" and its
expansive scope of available damages.1 1 4 A federal jury in Chicago
awarded Wessel $22,000 in back pay, $50,000 in compensatory damages, and $250,000 in punitive damages against each defendant, AIC and
Vrdolyak. A United States magistrate judge remitted the punitive damage awards to $75,000 per defendant and found the defendants jointly
5
and severally liable for the $50,000 compensatory damages award."
Both defendants appealed.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court
affirmed the judgment and damages award against AIC.11 6 However,
Judge Michael S. Kanne, writing for the court, concluded that the trial
judge erred in submitting the claims against Vrdolyak to the jury. He
wrote, "Contrary to the EEOC's and Wessel's argument, the actual reason for the 'and any agent' language in the definition of 'employer' was
to ensure that courts would impose respondeat superior liability upon
employers for the acts of their agents."" 7 In reprimanding the EEOC,
the court noted the similarities of the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII:
113 EEOC v. AIC Security, 55 F.3d 1276, 1279 (7th Cir. 1995).

114 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994) (purposes); § 12117(a) (remedies); § 12102(5) (definition of "employer").
115 AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1279.
116 Id. at 1285-87.

117 AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281 (quoting Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d
507, 510 (4th Cir. 1994)). The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that Birkbeck was decided
under the ADEA, but it declined to find any significance in that fact. Id
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Those statutes all limit employer liability to employers
with either 15 or 20, or more employees. That limitation
struck a balance between the goal of stamping out all
discrimination and the goal of protecting small entities
from the hardship of litigating discrimination claims...
The EEOC's interpretation upsets that balance and dis118
torts the statutory framework.
The court continued:
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 allowed successful plaintiffs under Title VII and the ADA to obtain compensatory and punitive damages in addition to the already
available types of remedies. The EEOC and Wessel
noted, correctly, that compensatory and punitive damages are typical remedies obtainable from individuals .... However, we conclude.., that the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 further shows that Congress never intended
individual liability. 119
The court reasoned that when Congress adopted the definition of employer in the ADA, Title VII and the ADEA, it granted only remedies
that an employer-entity, not an individual, could provide - reinstatement and back pay. "It is a long stretch to conclude that Congress silently intended to abruptly change its earlier vision through an
amendment to the remedial portions of the statute alone."' 20 In addition,
the court reasoned that since the caps on the total amount of compensatory and punitive damages were on a sliding scale based on the number
of employees and because there were no caps for individuals, this was
further proof that Congress did not intend for individuals to be liable.
Consequently, the court rejected Wessel's argument that employee
liability was necessary to achieve the "paramount consideration [of]
stamping out discrimination."' 12 1 The court reasoned that "[t]he employing entity is still liable, and that entity and its managers have the prior
incentive to adequately discipline wayward employees, as well as to instruct and train employees to avoid actions that might impose liability. '' 122 The court concluded by inferring that "Congress has struck a
balance between deterrence and societal cost" and that while the "remedial purposes [of the ADA] should be interpreted liberally, . . . that can118

Id.

119 Id.
120 Id.
121

Id.

122 Id.
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not trump the narrow, focused conclusion [drawn] from the structure and
123
logic of the statute."
6.

Other Circuits Disallowing Personal Liability

Five other circuits have also refused to impose individual liability
under Title VII and the ADEA. The Third Circuit, in Dici v. Pennsylvania,1 24 cited the rationale of other circuits and a previously vacated
panel decision in holding that employees could not be held personally
liable under Title VII.125
In the Eighth Circuit case of Lenhardtv. Basic Institute of Technology, Inc.,126 the sole issue on appeal was whether James A. Zoeller was
an employer within the meaning of the Missouri Human Rights Act
(MHRA). Peter Lenhardt was employed by the Basic Institute of Technology, Inc. (BITI) and served as BITI's admissions director. During
Lenhardt's employment, Zoeller was the president, sole director, and sole
shareholder of BITI. Lenhardt was diagnosed with cancer in 1992, subsequently had surgery, and was scheduled for radiation treatment. While
Lenhardt had planned to continue working while receiving radiation
treatment, BITI required him to take a leave of absence and subsequently
terminated his employment. 127
Lenhardt filed a two-count complaint against BITI and Zoeller in
federal district court. 128 The jury awarded damages for Lenhardt's state
law claim, but the district court entered judgment for Zoeller despite the
jury's verdict.1 29 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit was required to interpret
the Missouri Human Rights Act, but did so by drawing from analogous
federal legislation. 130
123 Id. Nonetheless, an important part of the court's reasoning is that the employer-entity
will have the resources to pay the punitive and compensatory damages awarded a successful
plaintiff. For closely-held corporations on the threshold of financial troubles, this might leave
a plaintiff, after a successful claim, unable to collect against the company. Individual liability
in this case would assist the plaintiff in collection of damages.
124 91 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 1996).
125 Id. at 552 (citing Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995); Grant v.
Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122,

1125 (10th Cir. 1993); and Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993)).
The court also made reference to Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours which was later vacated
en banc on different grounds at 74 F.3d 1439 (3d Cir. 1996). However, the court still referred

to the Sheridan rationale against individual liability. No. 94-7504, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
3892 (3d Cir. Feb. 28, 1996).
126 55 F.3d 377 (8th Cir. 1995).
127 Id. at 379.

128 Count I alleged violation of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988). Count II was a supplemental state law claim alleging a violation of the MHRA, Mo. REv. STAT. § 213 (1994).
129 Lenhardt, 55 F.3d at 379.

130 Id. The relevant statutory provision reads, "'Employer' includes..
in the interests of an employer." Mo. REv. STAT. § 213.010(6) (1994).

. any person

acting
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The circuit court ultimately declined to decide whether Title VII
contemplated individual employee liability. 13 1 However, the court
strongly implied that it would be disinclined to impose individual liability. The court noted, for instance, that it had previously declined to extend Title VII liability to co-workers in Smith v. St. Bernards Regional
Medical Center132 despite the possibility they might be considered
"agents" of their employer. Thus, the Eighth Circuit will most likely join
many of the other circuits in barring individual liability in federal employment discrimination cases.
In Sims v. KCA, Inc., 13 3 the Tenth Circuit held summarily that
"[s]uits against persons in their individual capacities are inappropriate
under Title VII.' 34 The plaintiffs had brought this Title VII action
against KCA and individual supervisors alleging that they were not hired
by KCA because they were Caucasian. The three-judge panel affirmed
the trial court's grant of judgment as a matter of law to the defendants at
the close of the plaintiffs' case. Quoting Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 135
the court stated that "relief granted under Title VII is against the employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act." 136
More recently, in Haynes v. Williams,137 a panel of the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that jurisdiction's position against the imposition of personal liability under Title VII and the ADEA. This panel also quoted
Sauers,13 8 but in addition, it addressed the remedial changes to Title VII
made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.1 39 This was necessary because, in
deciding against individual liability, Sauers emphasized that "a successful Title VII plaintiff was typically limited to reinstatement and back pay
as potential remedies" but the 1991 Act "adds compensatory and punitive
damages to the remedies available . . . the type [of award] that an individual can normally be expected to pay." 140 Nevertheless, the court
sided with the majority view that the language and structure of Title VII
as amended "continue[d] to reflect the legislative judgment that statutory
liability is appropriately borne by employers, not individual
14
supervisors." 1
131 Lenhardt, 55 F.3d at 380.
132 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994).

133 No. 93-2953, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 15065 (10th Cir. June 17, 1994).
134 Id. at *20.
135 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993).
136 Sims, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 15065 at *20.
137 88 F.3d 898 (loth Cir. 1996).
138 Id. at 899.
139 Id. at 900-01.
140 Id. at 901 (quoting Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314-15 (2d Cir. 1995)).
141 Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901.
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The Eleventh Circuit held in Busby v. City of Orlando,142 that all
Title VII "claims must be made against [a] municipal officer in his official capacity, not in his individual capacity."' 14 3 Busby was employed by
the Orlando Police Department and asserted Title VII and other claims
against the City of Orlando, the Police Department, the Mayor of Orlando, the Chief of Police, and two officers in their individual capacities.
The court dismissed the claims against the defendants in their individual
capacities stating that the "proper method for a plaintiff to recover under
Title VII is by suing the employer, either by naming the supervisory
employees as agents of the employer or by naming the employer
directly."144
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has also recently
14 5
decided against individual liability under Title VII. In Gary v. Long,
the court followed the rationale of Miller and held that the purpose of the
agent provision was to incorporate respondeat superior liability into Title
VII. Therefore, supervisory employees who are joined as party defendants in Title VII actions should be viewed as being sued as agents of the
employer who is alone liable for violations of Title VII.146

B. THE

HOLDOUTS

Only the Sixth and the First Circuits appear to remain ambiguous on
the issue of individual liability.
1. The Sixth Circuit -

Jones v. Continental Corp.

The most recent case from the Sixth Circuit to address the issue of
personal liability under Title VII is Jones v. Continental Corp.147 In
Jones, the plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of her
case and assessment of costs and attorney's fees against her and her
counsel. The plaintiff had brought an employment discrimination case
under Title VII and section 1981.148 In dismissing the plaintiff's suit, the
142 931 F.2d 764, 772 (1lth Cir. 1991).
143 kd at 772.
144 See id. Accord Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[L]iability

under Title VII is premised upon her role as agent o f the city, any recovery to be hand must be
made against her in her official, not her individual, capacity"). More recently, the Eleventh
Circuit reaffirmed Busby in Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir. 1994).
145 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
146 Id. at 1399.

147 789 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1986). See also Wilson v. Nutt, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
35117 (6th Cir. October 10, 1995), reh'gdenied, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 37525 (6th Cir. Dec.
19, 1995). The court in Wilson briefly surveyed opinions from the Sixth Circuit that have been
cited by other courts as supporting both the majority and minority positions. The court concluded, however, that the "Sixth Circuit has not directly addressed this issue [of individual
liability], and we need not do so in this case." Id.at *4-*5.
148 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
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district court observed that "the plaintiff could be a quite petty person
who assumed that anything that did not suit her was a product of racial
49
prejudice."'1
The Sixth Circuit, in reversing the district court's assessment of attorney's fees against the plaintiff and her counsel, stated almost casually
that "the law is clear that individuals may be held liable.., as 'agents' of
an employer under Title VII. '15° Adding nothing more to the discussion
of individual liability, the court proceeded with its analysis of why attorney's fees were inappropriate in this case. 151
Subsequent decisions in the district courts have allowed individuals
to be personally named in Title VII actions. In Kolb v. Ohio Dept. of
Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities,5 2 the court upheld individual
liability. The plaintiff, Kolb, sued her employer and three individual supervisors for failing to promote her, discharging her on the basis of her
race and sex, and retaliating for past charges of discrimination. The
court denied the individual defendants' motions for summary
53
judgment.1
The court in Connelly v. Park-Ohio Indus.154 similarly permitted a
Title VII claim to proceed against a supervisor. The court simply held
that "[i]n order for an individual employer to be liable under Title VII,
that individual must be an officer, director or supervisor for a Title VII
155
employer or otherwise be involved in managerial decisions."
2.

The First Circuit

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has yet to address the
issue of individual liability under Title VII or the ADEA. The district
courts in this jurisdiction remain divided over this issue. For example, a
149 Jones, 789 F.2d at 1228 (quoting the district court slip opinion at 4).
150 Id. at 1231 (citing Owens v. Rush, 636 F.2d 283 (10th Cir. 1980); Robson v. Eva's
Super Market, Inc. 538 F. Supp. 857, 862-63 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Munford v. James T. Barnes
& Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 466 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157,
158 (S.D. Ohio 1976)).
151 But cf York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1982).

The court in this case attributed the agency language of the ADEA as merely designating
managers who may be sued in their official capacities under respondeat superior. The case,
however, was resolved on the ground that the employer had fewer employees than the ADEA

jurisdictional requirement.
152 721 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ohio 1989).

153 "Holding responsible those who control the aspects of employment accorded protection under Title VII is consistent with the congressional intent both that the Act's effectiveness
not be frustrated by an employer's delegating authority ... and that the Act be interpreted
liberally in order to achieve its remedial purpose of eradicating discrimination in employment." Id. at 891.
154 No. C87-3139, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3901 (N.D. Ohio May 3, 1988).
155 Id. at *5 (citing Hendrix v. Fleming Cos. 650 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Okla. 1986) and
Diwa v. Bridgeport Textron, 632 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1985)).
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New Hampshire district court commented in Lamirande v. Resolution
Trust Corp.'5 6 that the "First Circuit has not yet defined 'agent' as it
appears in [Title VII]; however, there is a general agreement among the
circuits which have addressed the issue that an 'agent' of an 'employer'
is subject to individual liability under Title V11."157 The court went on to
criticize the Miller decision for "cit[ing] no authority for its conclusion
that [Title VII] was intended to protect 'small entities' rather than small
businesses" and that it is "much more likely that the size restriction contained in [Title VI] was intended to protect small family-run businesses"
that preferred to hire friends and relatives. 158
In Weeks v. Maine,15 9 Judge Morton A. Brody, in surveying the case
law up to that time, permitted Title VII and ADEA discrimination claims
to proceed against the defendants. Quoting Lamirande, Judge Brody
stated, "[tihe primary purpose of... Title VII in particular, is remedial.
Its aim is to eliminate employment discrimination by creating a federal
cause of action to promote and effectuate its goals.., of eradicating the
evils of employment discrimination. Title VII should be given a liberal
160
construction."
Within nine months, Judge Brody reversed his position in Quiron v.
L.N. Violette Co. Inc.16 1 The judge cited Singer v. Maine 62 and discussed the analysis in EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations,Ltd. 163 in finding
that the structure and logic of Title VII and the ADEA did not reveal
Congress' intent to subject individuals to liability. Judge Brody was
"now, persuaded both by the number of recent decisions on this area, and
by the rationale behind those decisions, that the agents of employers,
including supervisory employees, are not subject to personal liability
under the federal employment discrimination statutes."'164
The most recent district court cases from the First Circuit seem to be
uniform in barring individual liability under federal antidiscrimination
employment statutes. However, there remains a variety of precedent
from which to choose. 165 In light of the number of circuit courts ad156 834 F. Supp. 526 (D.N.H. 1993).
157 ld. at 528.
158 Id.

159
160
1993).
161
162
163

871 F. Supp. 515 (D. Me. 1994).
Jl (quoting Lamirande v. Resolution Trust Corp., 834 F. Supp. 526, 528 (D.N.H.

897 F. Supp. 15 (D. Me. 1995).
865 F. Supp. 19 (D. Me. 1994).
55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995).
164 Quiron, 897 F. Supp. 18, 20 (D. Me. 1995).
165 See, e.g., Flamand v. Int'l Group, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 356 (D.P.R. 1994) (no supervisor
liability under the ADEA); Braverman v. Penobscot Shoe Co., 859 F. Supp. 596 (D. Me. 1994)
(supervisor liability under both the ADEA and the ADA); Sagarino v. Town of Danvers, 750
F. Supp. 51 (D. Mass. 1990) (no individual liability under the ADEA); Lettich v. Kenway, 590
F. Supp. 1225 (D. Mass. 1984) (individual liability under the ADEA).
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dressing individual liability in the last two years, it is inevitable that the
First Circuit will settle this issue soon.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY ARGUMENTS

This Part argues that a rational interpretation of the statutory language of Title VII and the ADEA calls for the denial of individual liability under these statutes.
A.

THE PLAIN MEANING OF "AGENT"

The strongest argument for interpreting employment discrimination
statutes in favor of individual liability is in the literal reading the language of these statutes. "The task of resolving the dispute over the
meaning of [a statute] begins where all such inquiries must begin: with
the language of the statute itself."'16 6 When interpreting statutory lan16 8
1 67
guage, a court must first look to the plain meaning of the language.
The Supreme Court describes this rule as the "one, cardinal canon before
169
all others."'
When the language of the statute is plain, the inquiry ends with the
language of the statute because, in such instances, "the sole function of
the courts is to enforce [the statute] according to its terms.' 70 The court
should apply the plain meaning of the statute without looking to statutory
construction. 17 1 However, "plain meaning, like beauty, is sometimes in
the eye of the beholder."' 72 Thus, the statutory language should be read
in its ordinary and natural sense, and if doubts remain, they should be
resolved in light of the public policies intended to be served by the
enactments.
166 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989); Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
167 Note that despite language in the Congressional record by Senator Case that the word
"employer" would have "its common dictionary meaning, except as expressly qualified by the
act," 110 Cong. Rec. 6996 (1964), when a term is defined within a statute, that definition will
be used in place of the ordinary meaning of the word throughout that statute, 2A NORMAN J.
SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 47.07, at 151-53 (5th ed. 1992).
168 North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1983). "[C]ourts must presume
that a legislature say in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there."
Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 252 (1992). "[It is a] well established rule
that the plain language of the enacted text is the best indicator of intent." Nixon v. United
States, 506 U.S. 224, 232 (1993).
169 Germain, 503 U.S. at 252. See also United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S 643, 648
(1961).
170 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485
(1917)).
171 United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961); Estate of Cowser v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1168, 1171 (7th Cir. 1984). See also EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 92, at 130-31 (1940); Singer, supra note 167 at 151-53 (5th ed. 1992);

Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2054 (1993).
172 Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 737 (1985).
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In addition, because of the remedial nature of antidiscrimination
statutes, definitions within those acts should be given a liberal construction in order to carry out the purposes of Congress. 17 3 "[O]ne overriding
lesson the 1991 Act [broadening available damage provisions] tutors all
but its most unmindful readers is that Congress was unhappy with increasingly parsimonious constructions of Title VII.' 174
In the context of individual liability, the language of Title VII and
the ADEA defines the term "employer" to include the "agents" of employers with a sufficiently large number of employees.' 75 Applying the
plain meaning rule, it seems that "agents" are among the persons who
may be held liable under Title VII and the ADEA. The statutory language, "and any agent," is an odd choice of language if Congress merely
wanted to impose respondeat superior liability. Existing legal principles
have already made it clear that an employer can be held liable for the
discriminatory acts of its agents. Therefore, it appears that the plain
meaning of "and any agent" must be something more than imposing respondeat superior liability.
Nevertheless, while the wording of the statute deceptively suggests
that "agents" are employers within the meaning of Title VII, a closer
analysis indicates that the more reasoned reading of the statute as a
whole is that the "and any agent of such a person" language was meant to
incorporate the doctrine of respondeat superior into the statute. The use
of the conjunctive word "and," as opposed to the disjunctive word "or,"
supports the argument that Congress merely intended to incorporate respondeat superior into the statute. The disjunctive "or" usually separates
words or phrases in the alternate relationship, indicating that either of the
separating words or phrases may be employed without the other. Thus, if
the word "or" had been drafted in section 2000e(b), it would mean that
the "any agent of such a person" language could stand alone so that an
employer would be defined to include agents of a person engaged in
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees. Use of
the word "and," however, ties the "any agent of such a person" language
to the previous words in the statute, suggesting that the "agent" language

173 Tart v. Hill Behan Lumber Co., 31 F.3d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 1994); Wilde v. County of
Knadiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1994). See also Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439,
442 (5th Cir. 1986) ("In ascertaining the scope of agency, we have recognized that Title VII
'should be accorded a liberal interpretation in order to effectuate the purpose of Congress to
eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of ethnic discrimination.'") (quoting
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)).
174 Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994).
175 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988).

was not meant to stand alone in terms of defining "employer" under Title
VII.176

Thus, the language of Title VII and the ADEA does not clearly express any congressional intention to hold the "agents" of employers personally liable for their discriminatory acts. So what did Congress want to
do?

B.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT

It is an accepted principle of statutory interpretation to look to legislative intent when dealing with issues not expressly addressed by the
statute.17 7 In addition, a cause of action for illegal employment discrimination is purely a statutory creation, and thus, the legislative history and
intent of Title VII and the ADEA play a significant role in determining
17 8
whether individual liability exist under these statutes.
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
Most of the legislative history of Title VII is located in the Congressional Record. Because supporters of the bill proposing the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 feared that it would be buried in committee hearings, the
legislation was rushed through committee before being debated and
voted upon on the floors of both Houses. As a consequence, there is no
legislative history dealing directly with the issue of individual liability.
In fact, the primary concerns of legislators generally addressed the issue
of whether the legislation was constitutional or should even be

enacted. 179
Senator Humphrey, the main proponent of Title VII in the Senate,
stated that the primary reason for the minimum employee requirement
was that larger businesses have a more substantive effect on commerce.18 0 However, discussions of the minimum employee jurisdictional
requirements of Title VII and the ADEA 181 are significant to the individual liability debate. When Title VII was enacted, small businesses constituted ninety-two percent of the nation's employers. 182 Congress did
176 Johnson v. Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 844 F. Supp. 466, 469 (N.D. Ind. 1994)
(citations omitted).
177 See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.09 (5th

ed. 1992) ("Legislative purpose may. . . be a valuable guide to decision" for issues unforeseen
by the legislature and unresolved by the statutory language).
178 After the passage of Title VII, Boston College devoted an entire volume of its law
review to this statute. 7 B.C. INDUs. & COM. L. Rnv. 413-652 (1966).
179 See 110 CONG. REc. 6831-34 (1964).
180 110 CONG REC. 12,649 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey). See also Janice R.
Franke, supra note 2.
181 See supra notes 38 & 40 for the text of the statutes providing the minimum employee
requirements for jurisdiction under Title VII and the ADEA.
182 110 CONG. REC. 13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
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not want to subject small employers to the prohibitions of Title VII and
the ADEA because it did not want to restrict such a vital part of the
nation's economy.' 8 3 Accordingly, Congress imposed a jurisdictional
threshold requiring that employer entities have at least fifteen employees
before a cause of action can be initiated under Title VII. 184 As the
Miller court reasoned, "If Congress decided to protect small entities with
limited resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress in185
tended to allow civil liability to run against individual employees."'
It would certainly be nonsensical to impose liability on supervisors

working for an employer entities with fifteen employees and yet give
immunity to supervisors working for employer entities with only fourteen employees. In order to be consistent, individual liability would require that all supervisors be subject to liability under fair employment

laws. This, however, would render the minimum employee requirement
meaningless. This can not be what Congress intended.
2.

The Civil Rights Act of 1991

Title VII was amended' 8 6 by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991
CRA"). 1 87 As originally enacted, Title VII only provided for the reme183 Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. Am., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1015 (N.D. Ill.
1994). See also infra Part IV.B.2 discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the sliding scale
used to limit damages based on the number of employees signifying the current legislative
intent to protect small businesses from potentially debilitating liability.
184 Employer entities must have at least twenty employees before a cause of action can be
initiated under the ADEA.
185 Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993).
186 Title VII had previously been amended by the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub L.
No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108 & 5314 and various sections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e). Amendments were necessary because "[flacts, statistical evidence and experience demonstrate that employers ... continue to engage in conduct which
contravenes the provision of Title VII. The existence of such practices demonstrates the immediate need to effectuate the purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." H.R. Rep. No. 238,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2144 (1972).
Like other civil rights legislation enacted in the 1960s, Title VII was originally created
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. The 1972 Amendments expanded the coverage of Title VII
to include states and local public employees by abrogating state sovereign immunity pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment. The definition of "person" was expanded to include "governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1988).
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (discussing Congress' intent to abrogate state
sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment).
Note that Title VI's application to the states and local public employees was not affected
by the recent Supreme Court decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996). That decision held that Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity by
using its Commerce Clause powers. However, Seminole Tribe reaffirmed the holding in Fitzpatrick that the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally altered the federalism balance, and
Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
187 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in various sections
of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e).
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dies of back pay and other equitable relief. 188 The 1991 CRA expanded
the remedies under Title VII by making compensatory and punitive damages available to victims of intentional employment discrimination. 89 A
witness for the Committee on Education and Labor stated:
Compensatory and punitive damages will not give back
to a plaintiff, in many cases, the career that they lost or
the ability to rise further in that career. Congress doesn't
have the ability to do that. It's [sic] a lasting permanent
damage. I think what the increased remedies under the
bill will do, however, is primarily to act as a deterrent. 190
Congress passed the 1991 CRA in the face of several Supreme
Court decisions' 9 1 limiting the scope of fair employment laws and the
adequacy of their remedies. In addition to attempting to make victims of
intentional discrimination "whole" for their injuries and providing for
additional deterrence 1 92 against intentional discrimination, 1 93 the new
legislation brought remedies for gender discrimination into conformity
with remedies for racial and ethnic discrimination by providing for com188 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2000e-17 (1988)).
189 42 U.S.C. 1981a(a) (1) provides:
In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 of 717 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e3-5) against respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act
(42 U.S.C. § 2000e2 or 2000e-3), and provided that the complaining party cannot
recover under section 1981 of this title, the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed by subsection (b) of this section, in addition
to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the
respondent.
190 H.R. Rep. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 69 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 607.
191 The primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was to reverse five Supreme
Court decisions that were undermining the existing employment discrimination laws. See
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (shifting burden of proof in disparate
impact cases by requiring a plaintiff to show that an employer's practice is not a "business
necessity" contrary to Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 only prohibits discrimination in the
formation of contracts in hiring decisions); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (a third party
challenging affirmative action consent decrees can bring collateral action to challenge settlement); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that plaintiffs must prove
that an illegal practice was the "but for" causation for an employment decision); and Lorrance
v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
192 The congressional findings in § 2 of the 1991 amendments state:
§ 2. FINDINGS
The Congress finds that:
(1) additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace ....
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
193 H.R. REP. No. 98 at 65-70, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 603-08.
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pensatory and punitive damages 194 for all categories of Title VII
plaintiffs. 195

Thus, the remedies created by the 1991 CRA were intended to mirror those available under the Civil Rights Act of 1870196 ("section
1981").197 Notably, under section 1981, individuals could be held individually liable for racial discrimination. 198 Therefore, it may be argued
that since Congress intended the remedies to be the same, and since individual liability is allowed under section 1981, Congress intended to permit individual lability under Title VII through the expansion of remedies
in the 1991 CRA.
However, upon closer examination, it is clear that the language of
the two statutes differ. Title VII specifies that damage awards are "paya-

ble by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the
case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice."' 19 9 This
194 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1) provides:

(b) Compensatory and punitive damages.
(1) Determination of Punitive damages.
A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section
against a respondent.., if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice with malice or with recldess
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1) (Supp. 1994).
195 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. 1994). The new damages provision are codified as an
amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, rather than as an amendment to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq.
Before the 1991 CRA, compensatory and punitive damages were only recoverable by
victims of racialor ethnic discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See 137 Cong. Rec. H9551
(daily ed. Nov. 7 1991) (statement of Rep. Kleczka) ("[T]itle VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
is broadened by [the 1991 CRA] to allow punitive damages awards, bringing this important
antidiscrimination law more into line with its counterpart, section 1981 of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act.").
See also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989); Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
196 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). Section 1981 guarantees "all persons" the right to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and no other.
197 H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), 65 reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 603 ("Gender and
religious discrimination may have different cultural or historic origins than racial discrimination. It does not follow, however, that Congress should differentiate among them for the purposes of the remedial scheme provided by federal law for intentional discrimination."). H.R.
Rep. No. 102-40(I), 70 reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 608 (There was a "compelling need
to permit the recovery of damages under Title VII in order to conform the remedies available
for intentional gender and religious discrimination to those currently available for intentional
race discrimination under section 1981'). "The [Judicial] Committee intends that compensatory damages be awarded under Title VII using the same standards that have been applied
under [ ] 1981." H.R. Rep. No. 40(11), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1991), reprintedin 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 717.
198 See, e.g., AI-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 518 (3d Cir. 1986).
199 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) (emphasis added).
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is distinguishable from the wording of section 1981 which provides that
2 °°
"all persons" may sue or be parties.
In the context of judicial analyses of the question of individual liability, courts scrutinizing congressional intentions for expanding Title
VII remedies have come to different conclusions. 20' The Bridges court
reasoned that since compensatory and punitive damages are the types of
damages individuals could be expected to pay, 20 2 the current law permitted individual liability despite the more limited relief afforded before the
1991 CRA. 20 3 On the other hand, because the only relief available prior
to the enactment of the 1991 CRA was of the type that the employerentity would generally provide, Congress could not have meant to alter
the scope of Title VII coverage by merely amending the remedial
scheme. 20 4
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend
to permit individual liability are the limits Title VII imposes on the
amount of compensatory and punitive damages that may be awarded.
These damage awards have caps that are determined by the number of
employees working for the employer-entity. 20 5 The majority in Miller,
analyzing these limitations, reasoned, "Congress specifically limited the
200 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) (emphasis added).
201 Shortly after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, one court came out on both sides

of the issue. In Carroll v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1329, 1330
(N.D. Ala. 1993), Judge James Hancock observed that from the 1991 CRA "a strong argument
can be made that an award of compensatory and punitive damages (as opposed to lost wages)
can be made against [an] employee in his individual capacity." However, one month later in
Berr v. North Ala. Elec. Coop., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1331, 1333 (N.D. Ala. 1993),
the same judge could find nothing in the 1991 CRA to permit individual liability under Title
VII.
202 Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (the court
concluded that in view of this fact, arguments against individual liability on the basis of the
limited remedies available before 1991 lost "virtually all of its force").
203 Cf.Hangebrauck v. Deloitte & Touche, No. 92-C-3328, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17506
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 1992). But see Lowry v. Clark, 843 F. Supp. 228, 231 (E.D. Ky. 1994)
("The Bridges court begs the question" because "Congress did not change the definition of
'employer' in 1991, and expanding the type of available remedies does not alter the statutory
definition.").
204 See Pommier v. James L. Edelstein Enters., 816 F. Supp. 476, 481 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
205 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) (Supp. IV 1994) provides:
(3) Limitations
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section for
future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive
damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party(A) in the case of a respondent who has more the 14 and fewer than 101 employees
in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $
50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more the 100 and fewer than 201 employees
in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $
100,000;
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damages available based upon the size of the respondent employer....
[W]e think that if Congress had envisioned individual liability under Title VII for compensatory or punitive damages, it would have included
individuals in this litany of limitations and would have discontinued the
exemption for small employers .... -206 Another court observed:
If both the offending employee and the employer were to
be liable for monetary damages, Congress would have
provided some guidance as to how damages should be
apportioned, or, whether a plaintiff could collect the cap
amount from both the employer and the individual. And
if the discrimination against the plaintiff involved several co-employees, would each be liable for the cap
amount, based on the size of the employer? If Congress
had intended individual liability, it would not have left
these questions unanswered and would have incorporated individual liability into the damage limitation
scheme in some manner, perhaps by establishing indi20 7
vidual damage caps.
Even the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
has concluded that individual liability would be "inconsistent with Congress' clear intent to spare small respondents from large damage
awards. ' 20 8 Otherwise, individual liability would be subject to the
$50,000 limitation on compensatory and punitive damages in order to fit
within the damage caps in the 1991 CRA. 20 9 This logical conclusion,
however, conflicts with the clear language of the new damages provision
which only permits awards against employers with "more than 14" employees. 210 In fact, individual liability would seem to allow a sole employee of an employer-entity to sue the owner who is acting as an
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more the 200 and fewer than 501 employees
in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $
200,000;
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more the 500 employees in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $ 300,000."
206 Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted).
207 Smith v. Capital City Club, 850 F. Supp. 976, 980 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
208 Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under § 102
of the Civil Right Act of 1991, 3 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 6071, at 43 (July 1992).
The Title VII respondents discussed in these Enforcement Guidelines were not individuals but
labor organizations and government agencies. Nevertheless the rationale of the Guidelines
would apply to all respondents with less than fifteen employees. Id. at 54. This would seem
the correct position of the EEOC given its part in the AIC Security litigation.
209 Id.
210 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) (A) (Supp. 1993).
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"agent" for the business. 2 11 This would be a wrong result in light of the
minimum employee jurisdictional requirements of Title VII as well as
the minimum employee requirements of the damage caps.
A more egregious view of the damage caps under individual liability would be a literal interpretation of the statute. Under this analysis,
because the 1991 CRA contains no limitation for an individual, as distinct from employer-entities, the conclusion is that individuals are subject
to unlimited liability. At least one court recognizes that "it would be
illogical to cap the damages recoverable against the employer and allow
'212
unlimited liability as to its agent.
A final attempt to reconcile individual liability with the damage
caps would be to base the amount of damages against an offending supervisor on the size of the employer. However, while gearing the amount
of damages to the size of the employer makes sense if the employer is the
party to be held liable, it makes no sense if it is an individual who is to be
held liable. A plaintiff could presumably recover $50,000 from an offending supervisor at a company with 15 to 100 employees, but $300,000
from an offending supervisor at a very large corporation. This would be
the case even if both supervisors earn the same salary and engaged in
identical discriminatory conduct. Congress could not have intended the
odd circumstances that would result from such a scheme of individual
liability.
The inclusion of the compensatory and punitive damage caps of the
1991 CRA reflects the intent to preserve the original statutory scheme of
Title VII. The fact that the lowest statutory cap on damages can only
take affect when an employer has more than fourteen employees shows
Congress' desire to protect small entities and to omit individual defendants from the class of defendants subject to liability. The legislative history and statutory scheme of Title VII preclude the imposition of
individual liability.
C.

AGENCY THEORY

The Supreme Court has stated that in the context of analyzing employer liability under Title VII for the acts of agents, "Congress wanted
courts to look to agency principles for guidance. ' 21 3 Under the common
law of agency, an employer could be held liable for the torts committed
by its employees that occur within the scope and furtherance of their
employment. 21 4 Thus, the courts have used this doctrine of respondeat
211 See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571, 577 (N.D. I11. 1993),
affd in part and rev'd in part,55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995).
212

I.

213 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 447 U.S. 57,
214 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228

72 (1986).
(1958).
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superior2 15 to impute liability to an employer for the discriminatory acts
2 16
of its supervisory personnel toward subordinate employees.
Although the Supreme Court's mandate was restricted to analyses
of whether employers may be held liable for the discriminatory acts of
their agents, some courts have applied agency principles to the different
question of whether a supervisor may be held personally liable for discriminatory conduct.2 17 For example, in Griffith v. Keystone Steel &
Wire Co.,21 8 the district court, concluding that the liability provision of
Title VII permits suits against individual employees, found that:
the Restatement (Second) of Agency states that "Principle and agent can be joined in one action for a wrong
resulting from the tortious conduct of an agent... and a
judgment can be rendered against each." Thus the law
2 19
of agency recognizes personal liability of agents.
However, any analysis of the agency provisions should first look to
Congressional intent because liability under Title VII or the ADEA is
determined by statute, not by common law. In defining the scope of
Title VII and ADEA liability, Congress had to determine exactly who
would be held responsible for illegal discrimination and may have used
agency language to incorporate the doctrine of respondeat superior. After all, if the agency provision had not been included, the statutes might
have been interpreted as merely imposing liability only for the discriminatory policies of the employer entity and not the acts of individuals.
Because liability under Title VII and the ADEA is statutory, in order to
incorporate respondeat superior principles, use of agency language is
necessary, not redundant.
The Supreme Court discussed "agency principles" only in the context of traditional respondeat superior liability and did not apply them to
the issue of individual liability under Title VII or the ADEA. Because
there are two equally plausible explanations for the use of agency language, arguments based on this theory are at best inconclusive.
DICTIONARY 1331 (6th ed. 1990).
216 Meritor,477 U.S. at 70. Accord Levendos v. Stem Entertainment, Inc., 909 F.2d 747,
752 (3d Cir. 1990); Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc., 464 F.2d 723, 725 (6th
Cir. 1972).
217 As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals observed in dicta:
The Act imposes liability only on employers, but defines "employer" to include
"agent," ... a term that embraces but is more encompassing than "employee": all
employees are agents, but not all agents are employees.... On this understanding,
the statute is silent on the issue of derivative liability and it is left to the courts to
decide as a matter of federal common law whether to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior...
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1990).
218 858 F. Supp. 802, 806 (C.D. II1. 1994).
219 Id. (quoting REsTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY, § 359C(l) (1958)).
215 BLACK'S LAW
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DETERRENCE

One of the goals of fair employment laws is to prevent illegal discrimination before it ever happens. The remedial scheme of Title VII
serves the dual purposes of compensating victims of illegal employment
discrimination for their loses and deterring future discriminatory conduct: "The best way to obey these laws is to have the threat out there
that, if you do not obey the laws, it is your pocketbook that will reim-

burse the plaintiff.. .,220
Imposing personal liability in individual defendants would presumably further the goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace because individuals forced to pay for their illegal acts are more likely to
alter their behavior in the future. 22 ' In the view of some courts, Congress
could not have intended to prohibit prosecution of "the very persons who
have engaged in the employment practices which are the subject of the
222
action."
However, imposing employer-entity liability has a substantial and
sufficient deterrent effect of its own. "No employer will allow supervisory or other personnel to violate Title VII when the employer is liable
for the Title VII violation. An employer that has incurred civil damages
because one of its employees believe that he can violate Title VII with
impunity will quickly correct that employee's erroneous belief." 223 The
question now becomes whether any benefits from the marginal increase
220 See 137 Cong. Rec. S15,447 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Rudman).
See also Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1011-12 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (expressing considerable doubt that indirect deterrence of such supervisory employees
through marketplace pressures resulting from imposing liability only on their employers was
either an effective deterrent or the deterrent intended by Congress).
221 Id.

222 Dague v. Riverdale Athletic Ass'n, 99 F.R.D. 325, 327 (N.D. Ga. 1983); see also
Archer v. Globe Motorists Supply Co., 833 F. Supp. 211, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[I]gnoring
misconduct not effectively remedied by suit against the employer could lead to substantial
diminution of law enforcement under Title VII.").
223 Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc. 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993); See also Johnson v.
Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 844 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Ind. 1994):
[T]his Court is unconvinced that exempting supervisors from individual liability will
lead to... greater discrimination in the work place .... While supervisors may be
exempt from individual liability, their employers do not wish to employ supervisors
who discriminate and subject their employers to liability. Thus, supervisors hardly
will be encouraged to violate Title VII by this ruling-potential termination from liable employers exists as an effective deterrent.
Id. at 469.
But see EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., No. 92-C-7330, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15025 (N.D. Il. Oct. 20, 1993):
[I]f the person most responsible for invidious discriminatory actions (that is, the
employee who actually discriminates) were shielded from personal liability, that
person may never be sufficiently punished or deterred. Employers, particularly large
organizations, might not be able to accurately identify all of those employees who
engage in wrongful conduct. Failure to identify and punish such individuals may
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in deterrence created by imposing individual liability outweighs the inefficiencies caused by the specter of judicial second-guessing of employment decisions.

E. CHILLING EFFECT
Aside from the evidence that Congress never contemplated individual liability, the strongest argument against holding supervisors personally responsible for their acts of employment discrimination is the effect
such a law will have on business decisions. Individual liability has a
chilling effect on supervisors by perversely encouraging them to limit
their interactions to avoid exposure to liability thus leading to inefficiency.2 2 4 "Congress in the public sector context has recognized that
liability of individual personnel for acts attributable to an institutional
entity can have undesirable chilling effect on the ability of the entity to
perform its functions." 225
Additionally, however unjustified, increasing the scope of liability
will increase the potential cost of hiring minorities and women in the
eyes of employers. "Such suits actually provide employers with a distinctive-perhaps even a net disincentive-to hire minorities and women. 22 6 Companies may react by hiring fewer employees, or simply
moving elsewhere.
These concerns should make courts wary of imposing individual liability when Congress has failed to clarify its intentions. This is especially true when, as discussed further below, the plaintiff gains nothing
from such suits.
F. THE FAR EMPLOYMENT

STATUTES WERE NOT MEANT TO FULLY

REMEDY ALL DISCRIMINATION

Holding supervisors personally liable form their acts of discrimination will not increase the size of plaintiffs' awards. Furthermore, victims
of discrimination will usually recover compensatory damages from the
employer entity. In fact, employers often indemnify supervisors for their
mean that a hostile and undeterred management will remain in place awaiting its
next victim.

Id. at *29.
See also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines
andImprisonment Given the Existence of CorporateLiability, 13 ITrr'L, INc. REv. L. & ECON.
239 (1993) (asserting that employers have limited abilities to discipline their employees).
224 See, e.g., Bramesco v. Drug Computer Consultants, 834 F. Supp. 120, 123 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
225 Archer v. Globe Motorists Supply Co., 833 F. Supp. 211, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
226 Cong. Rec. S 15,463 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum) (quoting
John J. Donohue I & Peter Siegelman, The ChangingNature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 STAN. L. R-v. 983, 1032-33 (1991)).
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employment decisions and are the ones who actually pay plaintiffs.
Thus, nothing is gained from the creation of individual liability.
Some employers do become insolvent before victims are fully compensated. It is only in these rare cases that recovering from individual
transgressors may be the only recourse for the plaintiffs. However, even
in these situations, individuals would still not be liable for back pay.
This is evidence that Congress did not intend to provide recovery for
every instance of employment discrimination. As further proof, "Congress could have achieved eradication of discrimination with greater
force by not excluding employers with less than fifteen employees and
by not capping monetary damage awards, but it chose a more conserva'227
tive path.
Recognition of individual liability is inconsequential because the
employer entity will in most cases pay all the damages. "Although the
purpose of Title VII admittedly is to eradicate employment discrimination, a court may not expand liability onto another class of persons
merely to meet that purpose in the absence of congressional directive. '2 28
V.

CONCLUSION

A proper statutory interpretation of Title VII and the ADHA shows
that individual liability does not exist under the framework for ensuring
equal employment opportunities established by Congress. The purpose
of Title VII and the ADEA-to eliminate impermissible discrimination
in the workplace-is appropriately served by imposing respondeat superior liability on the employer-entity. Supervisors who break the law will
be quickly disciplined by their employers who must pay the bill. Thus,
individual liability will have no additional effect in reducing discrimination. However, individual liability does encumber legitimate employment decisions.
In the end, it is Congress' job to weigh the competing policies in
fashioning the best method for eliminating illegal employment discrimination. 229 From the language and structure of the statutes, the conclusion

227 Lowry v. Clark, 843 F. Supp. 228, 231 (E.D. Ky. 1994).
228 Id.

229 See 137 Cong. Rec. S15,479 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Bumpers)
("[T]he job of the U.S. Senate is to craft legislation on civil rights that is strong enough to
dissuade people from discriminating against their employees on the basis of race, sex, disability, or religious belief but not so liberal that is literally promotes litigation. That is a very
delicate, difficult balance to achieve.").
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is unavoidable that Congress did not intend to create individual liability
under Title VII or the ADEA.
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